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We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)
and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction α of the payoffs of each player gained from
direct game interactions is shared equally by the immediate neighbors. The magnitude of the
parameter α therefore characterizes the degree of the relatedness among the neighboring players.
By means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations as well as an extended mean-field approximation
method, we trace the frequency of cooperation in the stationary state. We find that plugging into
relatedness can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation in the context of both studied
games. Unexpectedly, cooperation can be more readily established in the spatial PDG than that
in the spatial SG, given that the degree of relatedness and the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual
cooperation are properly formulated. The relevance of our model with the stakeholder theory is also
briefly discussed.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODCUTION
Cooperation, where one individual incurs a cost to help
another, at different levels of organization constitutes the
fundamental building block of the natural world as well as
our human society [1, 2]. According to the fundamental
principles of Darwinian evolution all individuals should
act selfishly in order to maximize their fitness, thereby
ensuring better survival rates. Thus, the emergence and
sustainment of cooperation in a competitive world is a
conundrum [3, 4], and explaining the evolution of coop-
eration among selfish individuals is a central problem in
both biological and social sciences [5–7]. Evolutionary
game theory provides a powerful platform to investigate
this issue [8]. Specifically, two simple games, the pris-
oner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game, as the classical
paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperative be-
havior, have drawn much attention from scientific com-
munities [9].
The prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) describes the
pairwise interactions of individuals with two behavioral
options (or strategies) [1]: two players must simultane-
ously decide whether to cooperate or to defect. A coop-
erator pays a cost c for the coplayer to yield a benefit b,
irrespective of the strategies the opponent adopts. A de-
fector pays no cost and does not distribute any benefits.
Thus, for mutual cooperation both players receive the re-
ward R = b−c, whereas for mutual defection both players
get just the punishment P = 0. With unilateral cooper-
ation, the defector yields the highest payoff, the tempta-
tion T = b, at the expense of the cooperator bearing the
cost S = −c, known as the sucker’s payoff. In an unstruc-
tured population, where all individuals are equally likely
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to interact with each other, defectors have a higher av-
erage payoff than unconditional cooperators. Therefore,
natural selection increases the relative abundance of de-
fectors and drives cooperators to extinction [5]. Though
defection is the evolutionary stable strategy, all individ-
uals would be better off if they all cooperated, hence the
dilemma.
The snowdrift game (SG) can be vividly illustrated by
a situation where two drivers are caught in a blizzard and
blocked on either side of a snowdrift [10]. Each driver
has two choices: either getting out of the car to shovel
(cooperate: C) or staying in the car (defect: D). If the
snowdrift is cleared, both drivers get a benefit b of getting
home. There incurs a cost c for the labor of shoveling,
with b > c > 0. Consequently, if both drivers choose
C, then they both gain benefit b of getting back home
while sharing labor c of shoveling; i.e., both get payoff
b− c/2. Conversely, if both drivers choose to stay in the
car, i.e., D, they will still be trapped by the snowdrift
and get nothing. If one of the drivers shovels, then both
can go home, but the noncooperative driver avoids the
labor and gains a perfect benefit b, while the cooperative
driver gets the benefit b− c. According to the replicator
dynamics [5], the equilibrium frequency of cooperators in
the snowdrift game is 1−c/(2b−c). Hence, in contrast to
the PDG, the SG is a simple model for the evolution of
cooperation when defection is not an evolutionary stable
strategy [5]. Nonetheless, the SG still represents a social
dilemma in that the population payoff would be optimal
if everybody chose C [10].
One of the grand scientific challenges in the research
concerns the question of how the outcome of interactions
in social dilemma situations can be improved. Over the
past few decades, five general rules have been identified
that can offset an unfavorable outcome of social dilem-
mas and lead to the evolution of cooperation, includ-
ing kin selection [11, 12], direct reciprocity [13], indi-
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2rect reciprocity [14], spatial (or network) reciprocity [15–
17], and group selection [18, 19]. Besides, very re-
cent research on the PDG and the SG also highlighted
voluntary participation [20], dynamic preferential selec-
tion [21], degree heterogeneity [22–24], inhomogeneous
activity [25, 26], dynamical linking [27], asymmetric in-
teraction and replacement graph [28, 29], independent
interaction and selection time scales [30–32], appropri-
ate payoff-aspiration [33], social diversity [34, 35], mi-
gration [36–39], limiting resources [40, 41], conditional
interaction [42], coveting environmental fitness [43], and
dynamic social networks [44, 45], to name but a few,
as potent ways to facilitate the evolution of cooperation
(see [46–52] for surveys of this field).
Herein we would like to point out that, to the best of
our knowledge, a great number of game models in the lit-
erature assume that the involved individuals are selfish
and unrelated. Actually, it is the baseline assumption
behind the development of game theory in early years.
However, no one is self-sufficient and everyone relies on
the other for successful survival. In reality, we are more
or less, directly or indirectly, related with our surround-
ings, especially with those who share close genetic prox-
imity [53] and geographic proximity [15] with us. It is
well established that altruism can be apparently favored,
provided that altruist and beneficiary are genetically re-
lated [11, 12, 54, 55]. Furthermore, a large body of ex-
perimental and field evidence indicates that people gen-
uinely care about each other [56]; that is, we humans
tend to be not only concerned about individual success,
but also about that of others [57]. Very recently, several
insightful works have highlighted the importance of the
fraternity [58, 59], friendliness [60], or other regarding
preference (where the individuals take into consideration
not only their own but also their neighbor’s utilities in
the strategy-decision-making process [61, 62]), in resolv-
ing the social dilemma.
Continuing along this line of research, we here also
intend to study how relaxing the assumption of unre-
latedness will affect the evolution of cooperation in so-
cial dilemma games. For this purpose, a payoff sharing
mechanism is incorporated into the game dynamics to
take into account relatedness of individuals. In particu-
lar, a finite fraction of payoffs collected by the individuals
from direct game interactions will be shared equally by
their nearest neighbors. Our preliminary results show
that cooperation can be promoted substantially as the
the players are becoming more and more related with
each other. Our findings are further demonstrated by
using an extended pair-approximation method to theo-
retically predict the cooperation level. Furthermore, of
particular interest is that cooperation can be more read-
ily established in the context of the PDG than that in the
SG with appropriate parameters. In the remaining parts
of this paper, we will present in detail our main findings
and the corresponding explanations.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
In this work we study the evolution of cooperation
in the PDG and SG on a square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, where initially each player on site
i is designated either as a cooperator (si=C) or defector
(si=D) with equal probability 0.5. Each player engages
in pairwise interactions within his von Neumann neigh-
borhood, and self-interactions are excluded. The payoffs
reaped by the players are determined by the strategies
they adopted, and can be cast into a matrix form. For
simplicity but without loss of generality, the elements
of the payoff matrix for the PDG are rescaled such that
R = 1, T = 1+r, S = −r, and P = 0, where r = c/(b−c)
denotes the ratio of the costs of cooperation to the net
benefits of cooperation, i.e., the cost-to-benefit ratio of
cooperative behavior [10, 17, 46]. Accordingly, for the
SG, we can set R = b− c/2 to be 1 such that the evolu-
tionary behavior of the SG can also be investigated with
the single parameter, the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual
cooperation r = c/(2b − c), with which the payoff ele-
ments now read as R = 1, T = 1 + r, S = 1 − r, and
P = 0. The payoff matrices for both the PDG and the
SG are summarized in Table I.
A full Monte Carlo step consists of all individuals play-
ing games with their immediate neighbors simultane-
ously, collecting payoffs according to the matrices in the
Table I, preceded by a synchronous strategy-learning pro-
cess. In order to introduce relatedness among the players,
we assume that a fraction α of the total payoffs collected
by each player from direct game interactions will be dis-
tributed (shared) equally to his nearest neighbors. As
a result, the ultimate payoffs/gains of the player i in a
round of game can be written as
Gi = (1− α)Ui + α
∑
j∈Ωi
Uj
kj
, (1)
where Uj is the total payoffs harvested by the player j
from playing games with his kj neighbors (on the square
lattice kj = Z = 4 for all individuals), and the summa-
TABLE I. Payoff matrices of the two studied evolutionary
games: the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and the snowdrift
game (SG). The two strategies are cooperation (C) and de-
fection (D). The parameter r characterizes the cost-to-benefit
ratio of mutual cooperation. Note that r = c/(b − c) in the
PDG, and r = c/(2b− c) in the SG.
PDG: C D
C 1 −r
D 1 + r 0
SG: C D
C 1 1 − r
D 1 + r 0
3tion is over all the neighborhood Ωi of the focal player
i. Henceforth, α weighs the magnitude of degree of re-
latedness among the individuals. The larger the value
of α, the more tightly the individuals are related to each
other. It is worth emphasizing that, according to Eq. (1),
the final amount of gains obtained by each individual is
determined not only by the strategies of his immediate
neighbors, but also by those of his next-nearest neigh-
bors (whose final gains themselves again depend on the
strategies of their own nearest and next-nearest neigh-
bors). By means of this way, all the individuals in the
population can be either directly or indirectly, more or
less, related to each other. Henceforth, our present model
cannot be mapped into a spatial evolutionary game with
an effective payoff matrix as has been done in [58].
Before the start of the next round, each player is al-
lowed to learn from one of his adjacent neighbors and
update his strategy. A synchronous strategy-updating is
implemented such that the focal player i compares his
ultimate gains with that of a randomly chosen neighbor
j, and adopts the neighbor’s strategy with a probability
in dependence on the payoff difference [10]
W (si ← sj) = max
{
0,
Gj −Gi
ZG
}
, (2)
where G = T −S for the PDG and G = T −P for the SG,
ensuring the proper normalization of the probability. The
rule of thumb is that only the strategies of individuals
with better performance (in terms of the magnitude of
their gains) have a chance to be learnt by others.
In what follows, we will show the simulation results
carried out in a square lattice population of 256×256 in-
dividuals, whereby the frequency of cooperation, i.e., the
fraction of cooperators in the whole population, was de-
termined within 105 full Monte Carlo steps (MCS) after
sufficiently long transients were discarded. Moreover, all
the simulation results reported below are averaged over
50 different realizations in order to assure suitable accu-
racy. Though the results shown below are obtained for
synchronous strategy-updating, we note that no qualita-
tive changes occur if we adopt an asynchronous updating
of strategies, or if we use an alternative Fermi-function
like rule [16, 48, 63] for the strategy updating (please see
the Supplemental Material [64] for more details).
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
First we feature the frequency of cooperation as a func-
tion of the cost-to-benefit ratio r for the PDG and the
SG for different values of α, as shown in Figs. 1(a) and
(b), respectively. We observe that as the players become
more and more related to their neighbors (increasing α),
the frequency of cooperation in the whole population can
be greatly promoted under the same cost-to-benefit ra-
tio parameter r. Note that for α = 0 our model reduces
to those well-studied classical games, wherein the players
are unrelated with each other [48–52].
Let us first consider the case of the PDG. For the PDG
with α = 0, we note that there exists a critical value of
the cost-to-benefit rc ≈ 0.1 in the PDG, beyond which
cooperators cannot survive in the population. Notably,
rc quickly increases to much larger values as α is varied
from 0 to 1.0, which means that cooperation is consider-
ably supported (or the social dilemma is heavily allevi-
ated) as the fate of the players become more and more
closely correlated. More precisely, rc is about 0.1 for the
standard game α = 0, while it approaches around 0.2
and 0.46 for α = 0.2 and 0.4, respectively. Moreover,
for large α there arises a lower critical value of r below
which full cooperation can be achieved, and the larger
the α, the more expanded the region of full cooperation.
Particularly, cooperation can still attain a considerable
level even if the cost-to-benefit parameter r = c/(b − c)
is up to 1.0 when α = 0.6. For sufficiently large values
of α, e.g., α > 0.7, cooperators are able to dominate the
whole population for any r in the regime [0,1] (results not
shown). The tendency of the frequency of cooperation as
a function of r is also correctly predicted by the extended
pair-approximation analysis (see the Appendix for more
details), as shown in Fig. 1(c), although it significantly
overestimates the extinction threshold of cooperation.
Now we turn our attention to the case of the SG. Fig-
ure 1(b) shows equilibrium proportions of cooperators in
the lattice population as a function of the cost-to-benefit
ratio r = c/(2b− c). As can be observed, in all cases, co-
operation is facilitated altogether for any positive values
of α, which is similar to the scenario in the PDG case. To
be more specific, the threshold above which the propor-
tion of cooperators goes to zero increases with increasing
α, and even disappears for sufficiently large α (note that
we only consider the region where r is of physical mean-
ing; i.e., r ∈ [0, 1]). In accordance with our simulation
results, the extended pair-approximation method quali-
tatively reflects the role of relatedness in cooperation, but
underestimates the resulting cooperation level in general,
as indicated by the curves in Fig. 1(d). It is worthy point-
ing out that the discrepancy between the simulations and
the predictions by the pair-approximation approach is at-
tributed to the fact that the extended pair approximation
does not fully take into account the effects of the spatial
structures, especially spatial clusters [10, 46, 48, 65].
The simulation results as well as the predictions by
the extended pair-approximation method, summarized
in Fig. 1, explicitly show that increasing the relatedness
among the players can strongly facilitate the evolution of
cooperation in both the PDG and the SG. It was previ-
ously pointed out that spatial structure fails to enhance
cooperation in the snowdrift game and actually tends to
reduce the proportion of cooperators when the cost-to-
benefit is too large [10]. Nevertheless, the preliminary
results of our model show explicitly that spatial struc-
ture favors the evolution of cooperation in the context of
the SG, especially when the degree of relatedness among
the individuals becomes large enough.
The enhancement of cooperation by strengthening the
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Frequency of cooperation as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio (a) r = c/(b − c) in the PDG and
(b) r = c/(2b − c) in the SG for different values of α, as denoted in the figure legend. The players are located on the sites of
a square lattice of size N = 256× 256. The curves in (c) and (d) correspond, respectively, to the calculations by the extended
pair approximation approach for the PDG and the SG, which correctly predicts the trend, yet significantly overestimates
(underestimates) the benefits of population structures for small (large) value of α. The error bars in the data points shown in
(a) and (b) are smaller than the symbol size, and hence are omitted for clarity.
degree of relatedness among the players can be under-
stood naturally as follows. It is well known that for the
PDG in well-mixed populations, cooperators can not out-
perform defectors and are doomed to extinction for any
r > 0 [46], while in spatially structured populations, co-
operators can survive or even thrive by means of forming
tight compact clusters to minimize the exploitation by
periphery defectors [2]. The trick lies in the fact that by
forming large compact clusters the cooperative individu-
als can interact with one another more often than they
would purely by chance so that they are able to resist
the invasion of boundary defectors. Whenever the payoff
of an individual is determined not only by the behaviors
of his immediate neighbors but also by those of his next-
nearest neighbors, i.e., Eq. (1), the clustering of coopera-
tors reinforces further the interdependence among them,
providing a more promising avenue for their thrive. Un-
doubtedly, such reinforcement mechanism also works for
the cooperators in the SG. Furthermore, unlike the case
that neighboring cooperators will help each other out,
neighboring defectors will just craft their own demise in
both the PDG and the SG, hence undermining the contri-
bution of increasing relatedness among them. Taking all
together, the presence of relatedness among the individ-
uals is capable of supporting substantially the evolution
of cooperation.
According to the replicator dynamics in well-mixed
populations [5], pure defection is the only stable equi-
librium strategy in the PDG, while the equilibrium fre-
quency of cooperation in the SG is 1 − r, where r =
c/(2b− c) is the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual coopera-
tion as before. That is to say, in contrast to the PDG,
cooperation is already maintained in the well-mixed ver-
sion of the SG. Likewise, in the spatial versions of the two
games, the frequency of cooperation in the SG is always
superior to that in the PD under the same cost-to-benefit
ratio r [46–48] [also see Figs. 1(a) and (b)]. Thus, a well
established view so far is that cooperation is easier to
develop and can more easily persist in the context of the
SG than that in the PDG.
However, we find such argument is not always accu-
rate when the relatedness of the neighboring individuals
is incorporated into the spatial games, especially when
the degree of relatedness is large enough. To get a clear
inspection on this point, we plot in Fig. 2 the fraction of
cooperators in the equilibrium as a function of r for both
the PDG and the SG with α = 0.5. We observe that
for sufficiently high or low r, the frequency of coopera-
tion in the SG is greater than that in the PDG, which is
in line with the common belief that cooperation can be
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Frequency of cooperation as a func-
tion of the cost-to-benefit ratio parameter r for α = 0.5 in the
square lattice population of size N = 256×256. The symbols
and curves correspond to the results obtained by the numeri-
cal simulations and the extended pair–approximation, respec-
tively. Note that r = c/(b− c) in the PDG and r = c/(2b− c)
in the SG. The shadowed area shows the region where the
frequency of cooperation in the PDG is greater than that
in the SG with the identical cost-to-benefit ratio of coopera-
tive action. Note that the extended pair approximation fails
to predict the crossover behavior of the simulation results,
which highlights the vital importance of spatial structure in
sustaining and promoting cooperation in the PDG.
more easily established in the SG than in the PDG. Very
surprisingly, for intermediate values of r, the reverse sit-
uation occurs. The shadowed area in Fig. 2 shows the
region where the frequency of cooperation in the PDG
is greater than that in the SG with the identical cost-to-
benefit ratio of mutual cooperation.
The ultimate reason for this “anomalous” phenomenon
is that cooperators persist in the two games by means
of different manners. In the spatial PDG, cooperators
maintain by forming large, compact clusters to reduce
exploitation by defectors. By contrast, the coopera-
tors in the spatial SG usually form filament-like struc-
tures [10]. Given that the total volume is the same,
a compact cluster of cooperators will have many fewer
boundary defective neighbors than a cluster of coopera-
tors with filament-like structures has. Moreover, as al-
ready pointed out by Hauert and Doebeli [10], the emer-
gent dendritic patterns in the SG generate an advan-
tage for defectors, owing to increased exploitation in the
fractal-like zone of contact between the two strategies.
As such, the presence of relatedness will benefit much
more the cooperators in the compact clusters than it
does on the cooperators with dendritic structures. Conse-
quently, the combination of localized interactions, relat-
edness among neighboring individuals, and the different
manners of persistence of cooperators makes it possible
that cooperation is more readily developed and expanded
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Panels (a), (b), (c), and (d): Typical
snapshots of the strategy configuration of the individuals in
the stationary state for the two studied games, where C and
D are colored by blue (dark gray) and light gray respectively.
The left panels [(a) and (c)] are for the PDG, and the right
panels [(b) and (d)] are for the SG. Note that in each case only
a 100 × 100 snapshot of spatial configuration of cooperators
and defectors of the total 256×256 field is shown. We calibrate
parameters such that the fraction of cooperators in the steady
state are nearly the same in all the considered cases: (a) α =
0.5, r = 0.65 (PDG); (b) α = 0.5, r = 0.65 (SG); (c) α =
0.0, r = 0.038 (PDG); (d) α = 0.0, r = 0.35 (SG). With
these parametrizations, the frequency of cooperation in the
equilibrium is (a) 0.558(3), (b) 0.554(6), (c) 0.563(9), and (d)
0.566(2), respectively. Panels (e) and (f) display the cluster
size distribution of cooperators in the equilibrium for the four
parameter combinations in the two games (indicated in the
panels). The data points shown in (e) and (f) are determined
after a sufficiently long transient time (5 × 105 MCS), and
then averaged over 200 independent runs. The error bars are
comparable to the size of the symbols and are omitted for
clarity.
6in the PDG than in the SG for moderate r. We want to
emphasize that the extended pair approximation fails to
predict the crossover behavior of the simulation results,
since it neglects most of the spatial correlations (see the
Appendix of [48] and the Supplemental Information of
[10] for more details), which on the other hand highlights
the vital importance of spatial structure in sustaining and
promoting cooperation in the PDG.
The above argument is further corroborated by in-
specting the distribution of the strategy in the equilib-
rium. In Figs. 3(a)–(d), several typical snapshots of the
spatial configurations of cooperators and defectors af-
ter sufficiently long relaxation time are displayed for the
PDG and the SG with and without the presence of payoff-
sharing mechanism (i.e., relatedness). The two panels
in the left (right) column display the results yielded for
the PDG (SG). For the sake of comparison, we cali-
brate parameters such that the fraction of cooperators
in the steady state are nearly the same in all the con-
sidered cases. In particular, we choose α = 0.5 and
r = 0.65 in Figs. 3(a) and(b), α = 0.0 and r = 0.038
in Fig. 3(c), and α = 0.0 and r = 0.35 in Fig. 3(d).
With these parametrizations, the frequency of cooper-
ation in the equilibrium is about 0.56 for all the four
cases. It is remarkable that with the involvement of
payoff-sharing mechanism the cooperators in the PDG
are able to expand to form much larger clusters, due to
the enhanced reinforcement of reciprocity among the co-
operators forming compact structures [Fig. 3(a)]. In con-
trast, the expansion of the clusters of cooperators in the
SG is not so evident since both cooperators and defectors
will benefit from the payoff-sharing mechanism owing to
the dendritic-like structures (to be more precise, the more
rough surface) formed by the cooperators[Fig. 3(d)]. The
distribution p(sC) of the cluster size of cooperators sC
in the steady sate further substantiates this point. As
illustrated in Fig. 3(e), there arises a much more visi-
ble characteristic cluster size for the case of α = 0.5 as
compared to the case of α = 0.0 for the PDG, while
the shapes of the two distributions in Fig. 3(f) for the
SG deviate from one another in a less significant way.
Consequently, the overall results summarized in Figs. 3
show clearly that the presence of relatedness among the
players exerts much stronger influence on the stationary
strategy distribution in the PDG than that in the SG. As
a result, cooperative strategy could be more successful in
the context of PDG than that in the SG, provided that
the degree of relatedness and the cost-to-benefit ratio of
mutual cooperation are properly formulated.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
To sum up, we have studied how the presence of relat-
edness among the players affects the evolution of coop-
eration in the framework of the prisoner’s dilemma game
and the snowdrift game. The relatedness is incorporated
into the game dynamics by redistributing a fraction α of
the payoffs gained by the individuals from direct game
interactions to their immediate neighbors. By tuning the
parameter α, we are able to control the degree of re-
latedness among the players. The time dependence of
the strategy distribution of the individuals is controlled
by the imitation of a better performing neighbor. By
means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations as well as an-
alytical treatments, we have demonstrated that plugging
into relatedness can significantly promote the evolution
of cooperation in the context of both games. The larger
the fraction of the ultimate payoffs is contributed by the
neighboring individuals, the more readily the cooperation
can be established and persist in the population. Par-
ticularly, for high enough α, i.e., when the neighboring
individuals are closely related to each other, cooperators
can repel defectors completely and take over the whole
population. Furthermore, we have shown that, contrary
to our common sense, cooperation can more easily ex-
pand and be maintained in the context of the PDG than
in the SG, provided that the parameter α and the cost-
to-benefit ratio r are properly formulated. We explain
this by revealing the different organizational patterns of
the cooperators in the the two studied games, through
which the presence of relatedness among the individuals
exerts different effects on the evolution of cooperation
in the two games. In particular, the compact clusters
formed by the cooperators in the PDG are in favor of co-
operators boosting each other’s success efficiently in the
presence of relatedness, while in the SG such reinforce-
ment is not so strikingly evident due to the dendritic-like
structures formed by the cooperators.
It is worth making some comparisons between our cur-
rent work and two closely relevant works by Szabo´ et
al. [58] and Grund et al. [60]. In these two works, an
additional personal feature characterizing the fraternal
attitude or friendliness degree of the individuals is intro-
duced to account for the inclination of other-regarding
preference of them. The myopic strategy update (myopic
best response rule in [60]) is assumed for the strategy-
updating process: Rather than maximizing their own
incomes during the game, the individuals try to maxi-
mizing a utility function composed from their own and
the co-players’ incomes with weight factors (1 − q) and
q respectively. It was shown that the highest total in-
come is achieved by the society whose members share
their income fraternally [58]. Though the role of the tun-
able parameter q is somewhat similar to the parameter
α in Eq. (1), there are several significant differences be-
tween their models and ours. In particular, the utility
function in Refs. [58, 60] can be conveniently regarded
as a virtual payoff, by which the individuals aim to opti-
mize. By contrast, in our model the time dependence of
the strategy distribution is governed by a dynamical rule
resembling the Darwinian selection and the individuals
intend to promote their actual payoffs through imitating
more successful neighbors. Since the payoff sharing is the
rule of game per se in our context, we do not need an ex-
tra personal feature to characterize the other-regarding
7preference of the individuals, and they just take decisions
without considering the payoff or utility of others, as in
common practices [48–52]. In this sense, our setup of the
game is somewhat more simple and neat. Moreover, as
we mentioned before, each individual’s final payoff in our
model is determined by the strategies (or behavior) of his
nearest and next-nearest neighbors (whose final incomes
in turn depend on their own nearest and next-nearest
neighbors). As such, with the payoff-sharing mechanism
of Eq. (1), the fates of the individuals are more involved
with each other in our context (the individuals only care
about the payoffs of themselves and/or of their direct
neighbors in [58, 60]). An alternative view on α in Eq. (1)
is to consider the existence of a virtual super-organizer of
the games who will always withdraw a fraction α of the
payoffs obtained by each individual from direct game in-
teractions, and distribute it equally to all the participates
with direct interactions with the focal player. Though
we do not need the super-organizer at all in explaining
the effectiveness in promoting cooperation of the pro-
posed payoff-sharing mechanism, such perspective is still
meaningful: it will be of particular convenience to test
our current idea in online experiments with human sub-
jects [44], where the payoff-sharing process can be easily
done by the computer.
Associating the players’ ultimate payoffs with their
neighbors’ payoffs is equivalent to letting them sit in the
same boat such that they share a common destiny. In the
jargon of economics, the players and their neighbors are
becoming “stakeholders” in the system. According to the
stakeholder theory within the economics literature [66],
trusting and cooperative relationships among stakehold-
ers turn out to be more productive, and entities engaging
in trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative behaviors will
have a significant competitive advantage over those that
do not use such criteria. Mapping the level of coopera-
tion onto the extent of productivity, the presented results
of our model are in line with the findings in [66]. Due
to the simplicity and fundamental character of the model
proposed by us, we hope that it might serve as a starting
point to inspire future research work aimed at investigat-
ing the role of relatedness in the evolution of collective
cooperation in real human experiments.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Schematic illustration of the scheme
used for the pair approximation with focal sites A and B.
This configuration is used to determine changes in the pair
configuration probabilities pA,B→B,B . Since a fraction α of
the payoff of each individual reaped from playing games will
be shared among the neighborhood, the ultimate gains of an
individual are determined by both the strategies of his imme-
diate neighbors and also by those of his next-nearest neigh-
bors. Note that any correlation among those neighbors of A
and B (and also their further neighbors) is disregarded by the
pair approximation, i.e., all corrections arising from loops (if
any) are neglected.
APPENDIX: EXTENDED
PAIR-APPROXIMATION METHOD
By modifying the dynamical cluster technique [16, 46,
48], we are able to figure out how the fraction of coop-
eration evolves as the cost-to-benefit ratio r in the pres-
ence of relatedness among the neighboring players. It is
worth noting that the (extended) pair approximation is
based on the assumption of continuous time, and hence
on the asynchronous (i.e., random sequential) strategy-
updating [16, 46, 48]. In fact, we have simulated our
model with asynchronous strategy-updating, and the ex-
tended pair-approximation indeed matches the results
better (please see the Supplemental Materials [64]). For
the sake of clarity, figure 4 illustrates a small part of the
square lattice with four neighbors. The strategy of the
player A is updated by comparing his performance to a
randomly chosen neighbor B. The payoffs PA and PB
of A and B are determined by accumulating the payoffs
in interactions with their neighbors x, y, z, B and u, v,
w, A, respectively. The pair approximation is completed
by determining the evolution of the pair configuration
probabilities, that is, the probability that the pair pA,B
becomes pB,B :
pA,B→B,B =
∑
x,y,z
∑
u,v,w
f(PB − PA)× px,Apy,Apz,ApA,Bpu,Bpv,Bpw,B
p3Ap
3
B
(3)
8where the transition probability f(PB−PA) is multiplied
by the configuration probability and summed over all
possible configurations. If B succeeds in populating site
A, the pair configuration probabilities change: the prob-
abilities pB,B , pB,x, pB,y, and pB,z increase, while the
probabilities pA,B , pA,x, pA,y, and pA,z decrease. These
changes result in a set of ordinary differential equations:
p˙c,c =
∑
xyz
[nc(x, y, z) + 1] pd,xpd,ypd,z ×
∑
u,v,w
pc,upc,vpc,wf (Pc(u, v, w,Ωu,Ωv,Ωw)− Pd(x, y, z,Ωx,Ωy,Ωz))−∑
xyz
nc(x, y, z)pc,xpc,ypc,z ×
∑
u,v,w
pd,upd,vpd,wf (Pd(u, v, w,Ωu,Ωv,Ωw)− Pc(x, y, z,Ωx,Ωy,Ωz)) (4)
p˙c,d =
∑
xyz
[(1− nc(x, y, z))] pd,xpd,ypd,z ×
∑
u,v,w
pc,upc,vpc,wf (Pc(u, v, w,Ωu,Ωv,Ωw)− Pd(x, y, z,Ωx,Ωy,Ωz))−∑
xyz
[(2− nc(x, y, z))] pc,xpc,ypc,z ×
∑
u,v,w
pd,upd,vpd,wf (Pd(u, v, w,Ωu,Ωv,Ωw)− Pc(x, y, z,Ωx,Ωy,Ωz)) , (5)
where nc(x, y, z) is the number of cooperators among the
neighbors x, y, z, and Pc(x, y, z) and Pd(x, y, z) specify
the payoffs of a cooperator (defector) interacting with the
neighbors x, y, z plus a defector (cooperator). According
the definition of our model in the main text, the payoff
function of the individual A depends not only on the
strategies of his immediate neighbors, but also on those
of his next-nearest neighbors. As an example, here we
give out the payoff functions of A and B, whom play as
a defector and as a cooperator, respectively:
PA = Pd(x, y, z,Ωx,Ωy,Ωz) = (1− α) [(nc(x, y, z) + 1)T + (Z − 1− nc(x, y, z))P ] +
α
Z
[
nc(x, y, z)
(
(Z − 1)(pcdpcc
pc
R+
pcdpcd
pc
S) + S
)
+ (Z − 1− nc(x, y, z))
(
(Z − 1)(pddpcd
pd
T +
pddpdd
pd
P ) + P
)]
PB = Pc(u, v, w,Ωu,Ωv,Ωw) = (1− α) [nc(u, v, w)R+ (Z − 1− nc(u, v, w))S] +
α
Z
[
nc(u, v, w)
(
(Z − 1)(pccpcc
pc
R+
pccpcd
pc
S) +R
)
+ (Z − 1− nc(u, v, w))
(
(Z − 1)(pcdpcd
pd
T +
pcdpdd
pd
P ) + T
)]
For simplicity, we only consider the case where each indi-
vidual interacts with other Z individuals and their com-
mon neighbors (if any) are considered to be independent,
i.e., we consider a Cayley tree with coordination number
Z. The above two equations, Eqs. (4) and (5), omit
the common factor 2pc,d/(p
3
cp
3
d) which can be absorbed
into the time measurement units. In combination with
the symmetry condition pc,d = pd,c and the constraint
pc,c + pc,d + pd,c + pd,d = 1, these two equations can
be treated either by numerical integration or by setting
p˙c,c = p˙c,d = 0 and solving for pc,c and pc,d. Then the
equilibrium fraction of cooperators in the whole popula-
tion is obtained by pc = pc,c + pc,d.
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Supplemental Material 
Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors 
 
 
In this Supplementary Section we present the simulation results of our 
model defined on a random regular graph where the strategy-updating of the 
individuals is implemented in an asynchronous manner (FigS1); defined on a 
square lattice as well as on a random regular graph where an alternative 
random pairwise comparison rule
 [1-3]
 is used for the strategy-updating (FigS2); 
defined on a square lattice as well as on a random regular graph where the 
strategy-updating is implemented in an asynchronous way (FigS3). Other 
simulation settings are the same as those explicated in the main text. 
As shown below, whether our model is carried out on a square lattice or 
on a random regular graph, whether the strategy-updating is implemented in a 
synchronous or an asynchronous manner, and whether the alternative 
Fermi-function like rule is used for the strategy updating, will yield 
qualitatively similar results as those illustrated in the main text. Hence the two 
main findings in our work, (i) cooperation can be promoted substantially as the 
players are becoming more and more related with each other and (ii) 
cooperation can be more readily established in the context of the PDG than 
that in the SG with appropriate parameters, are robust to different topological 
structures of the interaction network, different strategy-updating functions, and 
different strategy-updating manners. 
 
 
 
FigS1: Frequency of cooperation as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio (a) r 
= c/(b - c) in the PDG and (b) r = c/(2b - c) in the SG for different values of α, 
as denoted in the figure legend. The players are located on the sites of a random 
regular graph of size N = 65536, where each player has exactly four interaction 
neighbors. The strategy-updating is implemented in a synchronous manner, just 
the same as what we did in the main text. 
 FigS2: Frequency of cooperation as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r = 
c/(b - c) in the PDG [(a) and (c)], and r = c/(2b - c) in the SG [(b) and (d)] for 
different values of α. (a) and (b) are for the case where the players are located 
on the sites of a square lattice of size N = 256*256. (c) and (d) are for the case 
where the players are located on the sites of a random regular graph of size N = 
65536. The strategy-updating is implemented by the random pairwise 
comparsion rule 
[1-3]
  
]/)exp[(1
1
)(
κ
ji
GG
jiW
−+
=←  with a synchronous manner, 
where  )( jiW ←  is the probability that the individual i will adjust to the 
strategy of the randomly selected neighbor j, and κ is set to 0.25 representing 
the strength of noise. 
 
 
FigS3: Frequency of cooperation as a function of the cost-to-benefit ratio r = 
c/(b - c) in the PDG [(a) and (c)], and r = c/(2b - c) in the SG [(b) and (d)] for 
different values of α. (a) and (b) are for the case where the players are located 
on the sites of a square lattice of size N = 256*256. (c) and (d) are for the case 
where the players are located on the sites of a random regular graph of size N = 
65536. The strategy-updating is implemented by using the Eq.(2) in the main 
text in an asynchronous manner. The curves in (c) and (d) correspond to the 
predictions by the extended pair approximation approach, elaborated in the 
Appendix in the main text. 
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